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THE SELF-REFERENCE EFFECT ON MEMORY IN EARLY CHILDHOOD 
Children develop a cohesive sense of self at a young age, and this is an influential and 
socially important construct by early childhood (Lewis, 2003; Fasig, 2000; Ross, Anderson, 
& Campbell, 2011). Despite the importance of the self at this stage, its influence on cognition 
has received surprisingly little empirical attention. In the adult literature, a large body of 
research demonstrates that the self has a significant guiding role on cognition. For example, 
incoming information that is relevant to self receives more attention than non-self-relevant 
stimuli and elicits affective responses, and such information is subsequently more likely to be 
successfully retrieved from memory (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Conway & Dewhurst, 1995a; Klein 
& Loftus, 1988; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Turk, 
Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011). Specific self-
systems in the brain have been identified that are activated during self-processing, and these 
are argued to result from evolutionary advantages accrued by attending to and storing 
carefully information that is potentially relevant or useful to self (see Klein, 2012). There are 
considerable practical ramifications of self-referencing, such as false confidence in personal 
recollections, and memory strategies in education and old age. In short, understanding the 
influence of the self is critical to any full account of cognition.  
Given the fundamental importance of self-referential processing systems, it is clearly of 
value of psychologists to apply a lifespan approach to understanding the functionality of the 
self (see Glisky, & Marquine, 2009). However, the developing influence of the self on 
children’s cognition is currently poorly understood. The developmental gap in the literature is 
very stark – despite the range of research showing how the self influences cognition in adults, 
little is known about how it operates in children. A great deal of research has examined how 
the self concept develops in infancy and toddlerhood, but almost none has investigated how 
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this impacts on early cognition. The current inquiry seeks to address this deficit, exploring the 
influence of self-referencing on cognition in early childhood. 
The Self in Childhood 
There is a considerable body of research charting the stages through which a sense of 
self initially develops. Over the first year, infants are argued to develop an ‘objective self’ 
understanding, a concept that self is a unique entity that exists across time (Lewis, 2003). By 
18 months, toddlers can show signs of self-awareness such as mirror recognition and the use 
of self-referent linguistic terms (see Lewis & Ramsey, 2004). By 3 years, self-conscious 
emotions such as embarrassment and shame provide evidence of a ‘subjective’ sense of self 
(Lewis, 2003). Further, the sense of personal ownership is strong and socially important at 
this stage, suggesting that young children can process external items in a self-referent context 
(Ross et al., 2011). 
The adult literature exploring the effects of the self on cognition have focused on the 
‘Self-Reference Effect’ (SRE) on memory, the tendency for information encoded in a self-
relevant context to be afforded a memory advantage over information encoded semantically 
or with reference to other people (Rogers et al., 1997; Symons & Johnston, 1997). A reliable 
SRE emerges with the standard encoding paradigm (for review see Symons & Johnson, 
1997), in which traits are evaluated with reference to self (e.g., “Are you modest?”), a non-
intimate other-referent (e.g., “Is Barack Obama tidy?”), or in terms of their semantic or 
physical features (e.g., “Is ‘calm’ a positive word?”). A trait recognition or recall test is then 
used to assess whether encoding the items with reference to self elicits a memory advantage. 
The SRE is particularly robust because it takes advantage of the multiple routes through 
which the self can influence cognition. For example, the autobiographical knowledge that 
accumulates in long-term memory provides a rich and accessible framework through which 
incoming self-relevant information can be organised and enriched (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; 
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Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Further, cues of self-relevance capture 
both executive and perceptual attention and increase levels of affective arousal (Bargh, 1982; 
Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Turk, van Bussel, Brebner, Toma, Krigolson, & 
Handy, 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter et al., 2011). These systems combine to increase 
elaborative encoding, leading to episodic representations that are more likely to be retrieved 
than memories not encoded with reference to self (see Conway & Dewhurst, 1995a; Van den 
Bos, Cunningham, & Turk, 2010).  
The SRE trait evaluation paradigm has been applied in a small number of development 
studies, with children who are sufficiently mature to meet the abstract task requirements. 
Mixed findings have emerged from this research. It has been suggested that the SRE 
increases between seven and ten years, in line with accumulating self-knowledge (Halpin, 
Puff, Mason, & Marston, 1984; Ray, Shelton, Hollon, Michel, Frankel, Gross, & Gabrieli, 
2009). However, other studies suggest that a stable SRE can be demonstrated from an earlier 
age (from five years - Bennett & Sani, 2008; from seven years - Pullyblank, Bisanz, Scott, & 
Champion, 1985). The picture emerging from this limited number of studies is therefore 
unclear. 
Adding to this research based on the standard SRE task, a small number of studies  have 
used concrete, pictorial encoding tasks, which indicate an earlier age of SRE emergence 
(Cunningham, Vergunst, Turk & Macrae, in press; Ross et al., 2011; Sui & Zhu, 2005). In the 
first of these studies, Sui and Zhu (2005) presented four-, five-, and ten-year-old children 
with cartoon figures depicted with their own or another child’s face. The figures were shown 
pointing at an object and participants were asked, “Who is pointing at the [e.g., tree]?”. Free 
recall tests demonstrated an SRE in the five- and ten-year-old children, who remembered 
more objects when ‘self’ was pointing. The younger children did not show an SRE in item 
recall, and no self-advantage was evident across any age-group when source memory (i.e., 
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who was pointing at the object?) was assessed. These findings were presented as evidence for 
the emergence of self-referential encoding around the age of five-years.   
Extending Sui and Zhu’s work, Ross et al. (2011) examined three- and four-year-old 
children’s memory for objects associated with themselves or another person. Associations 
were created through various means including action generation by self and other, actions 
depicted on self or other (e.g., objects presented on the referent’s photograph as if they were 
being used), and ownership by self or other. Unlike Sui and Zhu, Ross et al. found that 
children as young as 3½  years could show a memory advantage for objects associated with 
self. However, this effect did not emerge consistently across different forms of self-object 
association. Some encoding contexts elicited a SRE in recognition that decreased with age, 
but did not produce a SRE in free recall (e.g., Experiment 3; see also Cunningham et al., in 
press). In contrast, other tasks did elicit a SRE in free recall, but found that this increased 
with age (e.g., Experiment 7). Interestingly, in both Ross et al.’s study and Sui and Zhu’s 
(2005) experiments, controlling for ceiling effects effectively eradicated developmental 
increases in SRE. While these studies therefore provide preliminary evidence that a stable 
SRE may emerge in early childhood, it is clear that there remains a need for a systematic 
examination of the effect.  
Consideration of the mixed findings from SRE studies gives rise to two important 
conclusions. First, self-referential memory effects can be found in young children if age-
appropriate, concrete encoding tasks are utilised. Second, developmental patterns of changing 
SREs are complex and present an empirical challenge. In particular, it is important to develop 
a paradigm that cleanly explores the effects of self-referencing at encoding, maintaining the 
important elements of the SRE paradigm but adopting an age-appropriate design. The current 
inquiry aims to meet these needs. First, we consider the developmental changes in memory 
that may influence the emergence of early SREs. 
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Developing Memory Systems 
The adult SRE relies on the creation of rich memory representations, whereby incoming 
information is elaborated with autobiographical detail and organised within the self-
knowledge framework (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 
1997). Adding to this elaboration, self-referential encoding is also characterised by episodic 
binding (i.e., representations are associated with details of the encoding event). Compared 
with encoding information about others, participants are more likely to remember contextual, 
supporting material about information encoded with reference to self (Conway & Dewhurst, 
1995a, Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & Sapute, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2010).  
These characteristics of self-referential encoding may account for some reports that the 
SRE increases with development (Halpin et al., 1984; Ray et al., 2009), because younger 
children are less likely to produce contextualised representations of incoming information. In 
particular, research suggests that young children have difficulty creating associative links 
between constructs in memory (Wimmer & Howe, 2009), and with binding features of an 
episode together (Newcombe, Drummey, Fox, Lie, & Ottinger-Alberts, 2000; Raj & Bell, 
2010). Thus while children as young as three show some evidence of episodic memory, this 
increases markedly by six years and continues to improve across childhood (for review see 
Raj & Bell, 2010), probably as a result of cortical maturation and developing executive 
abilities (e.g., Brocki & Bohlin, 2004). Putting this evidence together, it seems plausible to 
predict that young children may show SREs in recognition memory, but that the characteristic 
episodic nature of adult SREs may be dependent on developmental changes in cognition 
across childhood (see Sui & Zhu, 2005).  
A second relevant mnemonic change is the development of autobiographical memory 
across childhood. This encompasses semantic knowledge about one’s own characteristics and 
personal details, as well as episodic recollection of personal experiences (Conway & 
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Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It seems reasonable to assume that younger children, having been 
subjected to fewer life experiences, would have recourse to a poorer autobiographical 
knowledge structure than older children. This means that the potential to enrich incoming 
information will be reduced in young children. Further, research suggests that the information 
contained in a child’s self-concept undergoes qualitative shifts between early and late 
childhood, changing from a focus on concrete features and possessions (e.g., “I live on Bell 
Street”, “I have a bike”) to abstract characteristics (e.g., “I am ambitious”, “I am shy”) (Eder, 
1989; Montemayor & Eisen, 1977). This change is critical because the standard paradigm 
applied in most developmental SRE research requires the children to be able to process 
abstract character traits in relation to themselves or another person. Given this developmental 
pattern, tasks exploiting concrete rather than abstract processing should provide a more 
appropriate method of exploring memory effects in young children. 
The Current Inquiry 
A concrete encoding task was designed to explore the impact of self-referencing on 
memory in early childhood. In three experiments, three different samples of four to six-year-
old children were asked to encode concrete objects with reference to themselves or another 
referent. In Experiment 1, recognition memory was used to assess whether encoding objects 
while thinking about themselves (e.g., “do you like apples?”) elicits a memory advantage 
over objects encoded about others (e.g., “would he[she] like balloons?”). Experiment 2 
replicated this design but assessed source memory for self- and other-referenced objects. 
Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether conscious evaluation of the self- or other-concept is 
required to drive SREs in childhood. Together, these experiments provide a thorough 
examination of the emergence and development of SREs in memory across childhood. 
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Experiment 1: Evaluative Encoding Effects 
 In Experiment 1 we developed a variation on the standard adult evaluative encoding 
task for use with four- to six-year-old children. Accordingly, rather than evaluating abstract 
character traits, children were required to evaluate concrete and highly-familiar items such as 
toys and household objects. The self-reference manipulation was achieved by asking the 
children to decide whether they or an unfamiliar other-referent would like each item. It was 
expected that young children would show a SRE, with more items evaluated about self being 
correctly recognised than items evaluated with reference to the other person. It was also 
expected that both overall memory performance and the size of the advantage for self-
referenced items would increase with age, as the children become more adept at elaborative 
encoding (Raj & Bell, 2010; Wimmer & Howe, 2009).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
The sample comprised 53 children aged four to six years, including 17 four-year-olds 
(41.2% male, age range 51 – 59 months, mean age 55.7 months), 18 five-year-olds (44.4% 
male, age range 61 – 70 months, mean age 65.3 months), and 18 six-year-olds (50% male, 
age range 72 – 93 months, mean age 76.7 months). All participants spoke English as a first 
language and were pupils at local nurseries and primary schools. The children were tested 
with the written consent of a parent or guardian and the research was approved by the 
University of Aberdeen’s Psychology Ethics Committee. The experiment had a mixed design 
with one repeated-measures (Referent: self or other) and one between-subjects (Age: four, 
five, or six years) factor.  
Procedure and Stimulus Materials 
The experimenter met each child twice. In the first meeting, a digital color photograph 
of the child’s face was taken. Before seeing the child for a second time, the experimenter 
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cropped the photograph using picture editing software, creating a 250 x 250 pixel (72 dpi) 
image of the child’s face on a transparent background. This picture was used to cue self-
referencing in the experimental task. Facial photographs of a five-year-old boy (‘Andrew’) 
and five-year-old girl (‘Amy’) who were unknown to the participants were modified in the 
same way to create male and female other-referent cues. 
The second meeting (within two weeks of the first) comprised the experimental task. 
The child sat at a table facing a 15” touch-screen monitor (connected to an Apple Macintosh 
laptop computer). The experimenter sat beside the child, in front of the laptop. The 
experiment was run using PsyScope experimental software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & 
Provost, 1993), and consisted of an encoding task followed by a recognition memory test. 
Encoding task. In the encoding task (summarised in Figure 1), a face was presented 
on a white background in the centre of the touch-screen monitor for 2000ms. In half of the 
trials, this was the child’s own face (‘self-referent’ trials). The other half comprised ‘other-
referent’ trials, in which the face of the unknown, opposite-sex child was presented (i.e., 
‘Andrew’ for female participants, ‘Amy’ for male participants). Opposite-sex other-referents 
were used in order to minimise the chances of participants simply projecting their own likes 
and dislikes onto the other-referent. In total, 24 self-referent and 24 other-referent trials were 
presented in an order randomised by the software.  
500ms after the onset of the face, an object was shown in a box to the left or right of 
the face. The objects comprised 48 toys and everyday household items (e.g., chair, kettle), 
and were presented as 250 x 250 pixel (72 dpi) color photographic images on a white 
background. The presented objects were taken from a total of 72 that were divided into three 
lists matched on object type (e.g., games, cuddly toys, furniture), syllabic length, stereotypic 
owner-gender and attractiveness to age-matched children. For each child, one of the three 
lists was presented in self-referent trials, one was presented in other-referent trials, and the 
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third was reserved to be used as foils in the subsequent recognition memory test. The use of 
these lists was counterbalanced across participants.  
The children’s task was to evaluate the object with reference to the faces. Specifically, 
they were asked, “Would you [Andrew or Amy] really, really like this object, or would you 
[he or she] not be very fussed about it?”. The two images (i.e., face and object) remained 
onscreen together for 1500ms, then a 100ms blank inter-stimulus interval preceded 
presentation of two yellow circle ‘buttons’ depicting a smiley and neutral face respectively 
(see Fig. 1). The children were asked to touch either the smiley face or neutral face button to 
indicate the outcome of their evaluation. Following the child’s response, the faces 
disappeared and a blank 1000ms interval preceded presentation of the next trial.  
Before beginning the experimental trials, each child was given three practice trials 
(one self-referent and two other-referent trials) to ensure that they recognised their own face, 
understood the task instructions, and were able to evaluate their own and the other referent’s 
likely feelings towards the objects. All the children recognised themselves and were able to 
follow the task instructions. After the practice trials, the children were encouraged to keep 
attending to the items onscreen to avoid missing any objects, and were asked not to talk 
during the task. After completing the 48 experimental trials, the children were praised for 
their concentration before being introduced to the recognition task. 
Recognition task. In the recognition memory test, the object images were presented 
individually in the centre of the screen. All 72 items were presented (i.e., 24 self-referent, 24 
other-referent, and 24 previously unseen foils) in an order randomised by the experimental 
software. Participants were asked simply whether each object had been presented during the 
encoding task. The experimenter told the children, “Don’t worry if you’re not sure of your 
answer – it’s okay to have a guess”, and recorded the child’s verbal response of ‘Old’ or 
‘New’ on the laptop via a key press. Following the experimenter-entered response, the object 
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disappeared and a 1000ms inter-trial interval preceded presentation of the next object. On 
completion of the recognition task, each child was thanked and returned to class.  
Results and Discussion 
The .05 level of confidence was used for all statistical tests. Effect sizes are reported 
as partial eta squared (partial η2). To analyse the recognition memory data, raw hit rates (i.e., 
proportion of Old items correctly identified as Old) and false alarm rates (i.e., proportion of 
New items incorrectly identified as Old) were calculated (Table 1). Raw scores were then 
corrected for guessing by subtracting the proportion of false alarms from the proportion of 
correctly recognised Old items for each participant. As can be seen from Table 1, the younger 
children had a relatively high false alarm rate, consistent with previous research (see Lloyd, 
Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009). This may reflect young children’s lower ability to bind 
features at encoding, which allows discrimination of the encoding event (Lloyd et al., 2009) 
from other memories. Alternatively it may result from younger children’s higher 
susceptibility to social desirability (i.e., children saying they remember an item to please the 
experimenter - see Crandall, Crandall, & Katkovsky, 1965). 
The corrected recognition scores were submitted to a mixed 2 (Referent: self or other) 
x 3 (Age: four, five, or six years) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This confirmed a 
significant increase in memory performance with age (F (2,50) = 22.61, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.48). There was also a significant effect of Referent (F (1,50) = 23.15, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.32), with self-referent trials eliciting higher recognition memory (see Fig. 2). The interaction 
between Age and Referent was not significant (F (1,52) = 1.34, ns, partial η2 = .05).  
At encoding, participants were more likely to give a ‘happy’ than ‘neutral’ responses 
overall (64.9% and 35.1% of responses respectively, t(52) = 8.19, p < .001), and to provide 
more ‘happy’ responses in the self condition (67.8%) than the other condition (62.1%; t(52) = 
2.12, p < .05). However, the proportion of items eliciting a ‘happy’ response that were 
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subsequently correctly recognised (mean .84, SD .14) did not differ from the proportion of 
‘neutral’ items subsequently recognised (mean .83, SD .15), t(52) = 0.52, p = .608). 
The pattern of memory performance in the current experiment suggests that young 
children can show an evaluative SRE in memory if age-appropriate stimuli are presented. In 
the current paradigm, the children had the opportunity to elaborate on incoming self- and 
other-referent items with stored knowledge about familiar, concrete objects. Interpreting the 
results through the standard adult account of the SRE (Symons & Johnston, 1997), the pattern 
of memory performance could be driven by increased elaboration and organisation supported 
by the self-knowledge framework. The children had access to knowledge about their own 
likes and dislikes, as well as autobiographical memories with which to enrich the items 
evaluated with reference to themselves. As discussed above, attentional processes could also 
play a role in producing more elaborate memory traces for self-referenced items. 
The current data did not support the idea that the SRE increased with development. 
Indeed, there was a (non-significant) tendency for the SRE to decrease with age (see Table 1, 
for similar findings see Cunningham et al., in press; Ross et al., 2011). This may be explained 
by the fact that the older children were performing close to ceiling (e.g., 4 of the 18 six-year-
old children were at ceiling for the self-referenced items, compared with none of the four-
year-olds). To reduce the potential for ceiling effects to influence memory performance, we 
therefore introduced a delay between the encoding and test phase in a second experiment.  
An additional motivation for Experiment 2 was that an analysis of recognition hits 
provides a limited measure of memory performance that can be driven by mere familiarity 
(see Conway et al., 2001). The SRE is particularly associated with episodic recollection, in 
which features of the encoding event are bound in a rich representation (Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995a; Conway et al., 2001). Indeed, Conway and Dewhurst suggest re-labelling 
the SRE as the ‘self-reference recollection effect’ (SRRE) to reflect this pattern. Accordingly, 
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source memory judgements that tap episodic recollection (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993) have been shown to distinguish self- from other-referent encoding in both younger and 
older adults (Cunningham, Van den Bos & Turk, 2011; Glisky & Marquine, 2009; Hamami, 
Serbun & Gutchess, 2011; Leshikar and Duarte, 2012; Van den Bos et al., 2010). This may 
not be the case in early childhood, however, because the ability to store bound memory 
representations matures across childhood with executive development, as discussed above 
(Raj & Bell, 2010). In order to explore the type of memorial representation elicited by self-
referential encoding in children, Experiment 2 also included a measure of source memory. 
Finally, a measure of executive functioning was included to assess its impact on the 
children’s self-referential cognition. 
Experiment 2: Evaluative Encoding Effects: Source Memory 
 In Experiment 2, the likelihood of ceiling effects was minimised by introducing a 
delay between the encoding and test phases of the experiment, and by asking participants to 
provide source memory judgements at test. The delay comprised completion of a measure of 
digit span, allowing executive development to be analysed in addition to chronological age. 
While this widely-used working memory task clearly does not assess the full gamut of 
executive abilities (see Baddeley, 1992), performance can be used to gauge the development 
of executive functioning (see Engle, 2002). Following Experiment 1 it was expected that 
memory would increase with age, and that self-referent items would be remembered more 
that other-referent items. Following developmental and SRE findings, it was expected that an 
SRE would be found in source memory, and that this would increase with age and executive 
ability. 
Method 
The sample comprised 55 children aged four to six years, including 18 four-year-olds 
(33.3 % male, age range 48 – 59 months, mean 55.3 months), 19 five-year-olds (26.3 % male, 
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age range 60 – 71 months, mean age 66.3 months), and 18 six-year-olds (61.1 % male, age 
range 72 – 82 months, mean age 75.4 months). All participants spoke English as a first 
language and were pupils at local nurseries and primary schools. The children were tested 
with the written consent of a parent or guardian and the research was approved by the 
University of Aberdeen’s Psychology Ethics Committee. The experiment had a mixed design 
with one repeated-measures (Referent: self or other) and one between-subjects (Age: four, 
five, or six years) factor.  
Procedure and Stimulus Materials 
The stimuli and procedure exactly followed that of Experiment 1 for the first session 
and the encoding task of the second session (see Fig. 1), with facial image cues of either self- 
or other-referent being presented with a total of 48 familiar concrete objects. Again, 
participants were asked to press neutral or smiley face buttons to indicate their evaluation of 
the object. Following the encoding task, the experimenter administered the British Ability 
Scales (BAS) II: Recall of Digits Forward subscale (Elliott, Smith, & McCulloch, 1996). This 
measure of short-term auditory memory is commonly used as a measure of working memory 
and is correlated with general executive ability (see Engle, 2002). Completing this task 
created a break of approximately five minutes between the encoding and recognition tasks. 
Presentation of the items in the recognition task followed that of Experiment 1. All 72 
items (24 self-referent, 24 other-referent, and 24 previously unseen) were presented 
individually in the centre of the screen in an order randomised by the software. The 
recognition test was a one-step source memory test, with participants being asked to respond 
to each picture with one of the following answers: “New picture”, “Shown with me” or 
“Shown with Andrew [Amy]”. As in Experiment 1, the children were told that they could 
guess if they were not sure of their answer. The child gave a verbal response which was 
entered into the laptop by the experimenter via a keypress. The object then disappeared and a 
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1000ms inter-trial interval preceded presentation of the next object. On completion of the 
source memory task, the child was thanked and returned to class.  
Results and Discussion 
 Raw hits rates and false alarm rates are presented in Table 1. As in Experiment 1, 
recognition scores were corrected for guessing by subtracting the proportion of false alarms 
(responses of “Shown with me” or “Shown with Andrew [Amy]” to New items) from the 
proportion of correctly recognised Old items for each participant. Two source recognition 
scores were also calculated for each participant. The self-referent source score was calculated 
by subtracting the proportion of ‘self’ false alarm rate (New items incorrectly identified as 
“Shown with me”) from the proportion of self-referent items correctly identified as “Shown 
with me”. The other-referent source score was scored by subtracting ‘other’ false alarm rate 
from items correctly identified as shown with the other referent. 
Recognition memory. Although source memory was the dependent variable of 
interest in the current experiment, recognition data were also analysed for comparison with 
the results of Experiment 1. Participants’ recognition scores were submitted to a mixed 2 
(Referent: self or other) x 3 (Age: four, five, or six years) ANOVA which revealed a 
significant increase in overall memory with Age (F (2,52) = 3.53, p < .05, partial η2 = .12). 
Further, self-referent items were significantly more likely to be remembered than other-
referent items (F (1,52) = 10.19, p < .005, partial η2 = .16), regardless of age (interaction: F 
(2,52) = 1.67, ns, partial η2 = .06). This pattern of results replicates the findings of 
Experiment 1, suggesting that a robust SRE can be demonstrated in early childhood 
recognition memory.  
At encoding, participants were more likely to give a ‘happy’ than ‘neutral’ response 
(61.8% and 38.2% of responses respectively, t(54) = 5.23, p < .001). Like Experiment 1, 
there was also a tendency for participants to provide more ‘happy’ responses in the self 
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condition (64.6%) than the other condition (59.1%; t(54) = 2.26, p < .05). However, 
following the pattern of Experiment 1 this did not impact on subsequent memory (mean 
‘happy’ item recognition: .88 (SD .09) mean ‘neutral’ item recognition .86 (SD .16); t(54) = 
1.62, p = .11). 
Source memory. A mixed 2 (Referent: self or other) x 3 (Age: four, five, or six 
years) ANOVA revealed a similar pattern of results for participants’ source memory. The 
effect of age was significant (F (2,52) = 3.34, p < .05, partial η2 = .11), with memory 
performance increasing between four and six years. There was also a significant effect of 
referent (F (1,52) = 12.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .18), reflecting a tendency for self-referent 
items to be linked with their correct source more often than other-referent items (see Fig. 3). 
As in recognition memory performance, this SRE was consistent across the age groups 
(Referent x Age interaction: F (2,52) = 0.78, ns, partial η2 = .03).  
Developmental patterns. Correlations were calculated to examine the impact of 
chronological age and cognitive ability on the memory advantage for self-referenced items. A 
‘self-referential advantage’ score was calculated by subtracting the recognition score for 
other-referent items from that of self-referent items. Separate correlations were calculated for 
Recognition and Source data. Chronological age in months was not significantly correlated 
with the memory advantage for self-referent items in either recognition (r(55) = -0.12, p = 
.39) or source memory (r(55) = -0.01, p = .92), confirming the pattern identified in the 
ANOVAs with this more sensitive measure of age. Two participants did not complete the 
measure of executive functioning ability (the Recall of Digits Forward sub-test of the BAS), 
because they asked to stop. Recall of Digits performance was transformed into an ability 
score, following the BAS administration procedure (see Eliot et al., 1996). Like chronological 
age, this measure was not found to correlate with the memory advantage for self-referent 
items in either recognition (r(53) = -0.046, p = .75) or source memory (r(53) = -0.051, p = 
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.72). Together, these correlations suggest that the observed SREs in memory are robust and 
seemingly unrelated to changes in age or cognitive ability.  
The absence of a developmental increase in the size of the SRE in source memory is 
somewhat surprising. The older children in our sample were expected to remember more 
item–referent pairings, in line with their developing binding abilities (see Lloyd et al., 2009; 
Raj & Bell, 2010). The current findings suggest that the self-referential encoding context is a 
sufficiently powerful encoding tool to allow even young children to store a strong memory 
trace. Complicating this argument, more other-referent items were misattributed to self than 
self-referent items were misattributed to other (F(1,52) = 8.39, p < .01), regardless of age 
(interaction F(2,52) = .09, ns). This suggests that the children had a tendency to erroneously 
assume familiar items were self-referent, an interesting pattern that is somewhat counter-
intuitive given the type of recollection typically associated with SREs. Fully exploring this 
additional potential source of self-referential bias in a two-step (recognition, source) memory 
test (see Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b) could be of great value in future research.  
The finding of an early source memory SRE may be due to specific features of self-
referential encoding being functionally distinct from other-referent processing. Rather than 
simply increasing depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), self-referent encoding is 
characterised by particular features such as episodic binding (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995a) 
and increases in both elaboration and organisation at encoding (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; 
Klein & Loftus, 1988). Further, neuroimaging research suggests that self-referential 
processing activates a specific midline cortical network that is not associated with either 
other-referent cognition nor increased depth of processing (Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, 
Inati, & Heatherton, 2002; Northoff, Heinzel, de Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & 
Panksepp, 2006). These memory-supporting features of self-referential encoding may help to 
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explain why even young children are able to show the SRE in both recognition and source 
memory.  
This pattern speaks to recent work suggesting that SREs may be driven by low-level, 
automatic responses to self-cues, as well as elaboration and organisation by the self-
knowledge framework (see Turk et al., 2008; Ross et al, 2011). In particular, neuroimaging 
research has suggested that attention might be the driving mechanism, with self-cues eliciting 
attentional responses that could support enhanced encoding (Gray et al., 2004; Turk, van 
Bussel, Waiter et al., 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Brebner et al., 2011). If this mechanism is a 
critical driver of SREs, it would account for the finding of the current study that neither 
developing executive ability nor increasing self-knowledge with age contributed to the size of 
the memory advantage for self-referenced items. Young children’s extant self-concept and 
self-recognition might be sufficient to elicit an automatic attentional response to self-cues, 
eliciting a SRE without relying on elaboration by self-knowledge. 
This reasoning raises the interesting question of whether SREs require activation of the 
self-knowledge framework at all. In the standard SRE paradigm, the trait evaluation task 
requires participants to consciously consider the self- and other-concept in relation to the 
traits during encoding. In Experiments 1 and 2, evaluation of the child’s own and another’s 
likes and dislikes requires a similar self- and other-evaluation. However, such effortful 
consideration may not be a necessary prerequisite to SRE elicitation. Turk et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that when self-images are paired with to-be-encoded stimuli, this elicits a 
memory advantage compared to stimuli paired with images of other people. In this study, half 
of the participants were simply asked to monitor the location of the stimuli; the identity of the 
image was task-irrelevant (‘incidental’ encoding condition). The other participants evaluated 
the stimuli with reference to the person shown in the image (‘evaluative’ encoding condition).  
The procedure, stimuli, and responses for the two conditions were identical, so memory 
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performance could be directly compared. This comparison revealed that a significant SRE 
was elicited in both the incidental and evaluative encoding conditions, but that the effect was 
more pronounced in the latter.  
This pattern was interpreted as suggesting that in both conditions, an increase in 
automatic responses to self-cues (compared to other-cues) drew attention to the self-paired 
stimuli, enhancing encoding. However there was an additive effect of consciously 
considering the self that may have further enhanced self-referential encoding in the evaluative 
condition, by providing access to the elaborative potential of autobiographical knowledge. To 
examine whether this intriguing pattern of adult SRE elicitation would also emerge in early 
childhood, a third experiment was designed in which participants completed an encoding task 
involving ‘incidental’ pairing of the self or another referent with stimuli. 
Experiment 3: Incidental Encoding Effects 
Following the design of Turk et al.’s (2008) study, Experiment 3 adapted the design 
of Experiment 2 such that the procedure, stimuli, and responses were matched, but the 
children’s task was to monitor object location (left or right), rather than to evaluate the object 
against a referent. Following the findings of Experiment 2, it was expected that this incidental 
encoding procedure would elicit stable SREs in both recognition and source memory 
performance.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
The sample comprised 56 children aged four to six years, with 20 four-year-olds (45.0 
% male, age range 48 – 59 months, mean age 52.0 months), 18 five-year-olds (61.1 % male, 
age range 60 – 71 months, mean age 67.2 months), and 18 six-year-olds (55.6 % male, age 
range 72 – 83 months, mean age 77.7 months). All participants spoke English as a first 
language and were pupils at local nurseries and primary schools. The children were tested 
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with the written consent of a parent or guardian and the research was approved by the 
University of Aberdeen’s Psychology Ethics Committee. The experiment had a mixed design 
with repeated-measures (Referent: self or other) and between-subjects (Age: four, five, or six 
years) factors. The dependent variables were recognition memory and source memory.  
Procedure and Stimulus Materials 
The stimuli and procedure exactly followed that of Experiment 2 for the encoding and 
test phases of the experiment, with one critical exception. Instead of being asked to evaluate 
each object with reference to self or the other referent, the children were asked simply to 
report on which side of the screen the object had been presented. As Fig. 1 shows, this 
involved presenting two empty yellow circles as response buttons, with no neutral or smiley 
faces. The size, color, brightness, and position of these ‘left’ and ‘right’ buttons were exactly 
matched with the face response buttons presented in Experiments 1 and 2. As in Experiment 
2, when all the items had been presented, participants completed the digit span task, then a 
one-step source memory test including all 72 items (24 self-referent, 24 other-referent, and 24 
previously unseen items), before being thanked and returned to class. 
Results and Discussion 
 As in Experiment 2, participants’ recognition and source memory data were corrected 
for guessing by subtracting the relevant false alarm rate from the correctly recognised Old 
items. Raw hit, source, and false alarm rates can be found in Table 1. The encoding task 
elicited a low mean error rate of 5.7% so target items eliciting errors at encoding were not 
excluded from the memory analysis. 
Recognition memory. The data were submitted to a 2 (Referent: self or other) x 3 
(Age: four, five, or six years) ANOVA, from which the only significant pattern to emerge 
was that self-referent items were more likely to be remembered than other-referent items (F 
(1,53) = 10.09, p < .005, partial η2 = .16). Neither the main effect of Age (F (2,53) = 2.20, ns, 
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partial η2 = .08) nor the Age X Referent interaction (F (2,53) = 0.06, ns, partial η2 = .002) 
were significant.  
Source memory. Participants’ source memory scores were also submitted to a mixed 
2 (Referent: self or other) x 3 (Age: four, five, or six years) ANOVA. This revealed a 
significant increase in performance with age (F (2,53) = 3.91, p < .05, partial η2 = .13) and a 
strong effect of Referent, with self-referent items being associated with better source memory 
than other-referent items F (1,53) = 13.05, p < .001, partial η2 = .20 – see Fig. 4). The 
interaction between the factors was non-significant (F (2,53) = 0.19, ns, partial η2 = .007). 
Developmental patterns. As in Experiment 2, the relationship between the self-
referent memory advantage in both recognition and source memory was examined by 
calculating a self-referential advantage score (recognition scores for other-referent items 
subtracted from that of self-referent items). Replicating the pattern found in Exp. 2, there was 
no relationship between age in months and the self-referential memory advantage in either 
recognition (r(56) = 0.03, p = .82) or source memory (r(56) = 0.04, p = .77). Similarly, 
cognitive ability as gauged by the Recall of Digits Forward test (transformed into ability 
scores) had no relationship with the self-reference advantage in either recognition (r(56) = 
0.12, p = .38) or source memory (r(56) = -0.11, p = .43). Following the pattern of memory 
performance in Exp. 2, these findings suggest that the children’s increasing age and 
developing executive abilities did not impact on their ability to preferentially encode self-
referential information. 
Experiments 2 and 3: Additional Analysis 
The pattern of self- and other-referent encoding revealed by both recognition memory 
and source monitoring scores suggests that incidental associations between self and external 
stimuli elicit similar effects to evaluative processing. In order to more effectively gauge the 
relative impact of incidental and evaluative SREs in early childhood, an additional analysis 
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was performed on the data collected in Experiments 2 and 3 together. Combining the data 
from Experiments 2 and 3 produced a sample of 111 children including 38 four-year-olds 
(39.5 % male, age range 48 – 59 months, mean age 53.6 months), 37 five-year-olds (43.2 % 
male, age range 60 – 71 months, mean age 66.7 months), and 36 six-year-olds (58.3 % male, 
age range 72 – 83 months, mean age 76.6 months). 
Recognition memory. Participants’ hit scores were submitted to a mixed 2 (Encoding 
condition: Evaluative or Incidental) x 2 (Referent: self or other) x 3 (Age: four, five, or six 
years) ANOVA. All three main effects were found to be significant, with memory being 
better under Evaluative than the Incidental encoding conditions (F (1,105) = 18.02, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .15), increasing with age (F (2,105) = 5.58, p < .005, partial η2 = .10), and being 
better for self-referent than other-referent items (F (1,105) = 20.2, p < .001, partial η2 = .16). 
Of particular note, the impact of referent on memory was consistent across the two 
experiments (see Fig. 5) with no evidence of an interaction between Encoding condition and 
Referent (F (1,105) = 0.07, ns, partial η2 = .001). No other interactions between the variables 
approached significance. 
Source memory. An additional analysis comparing source memory across the two 
encoding conditions was also performed. This revealed that source memory elicited an 
identical pattern of results to Recognition memory, with the three factors each having a 
significant effect in the same direction (Encoding condition: (F (1,105) = 25.60, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .20), Age (F (2,105) = 5.85, p < .005, partial η2 = .10), Referent (F (1,105) = 
24.84, p < .001, partial η2 = .19). Again, no interactions approached significance. 
This analysis provides an interesting contrast to the findings reported by Turk et al. 
(2008). Turk et al. also found that both evaluative and incidental encoding elicited a self-
referential advantage, but that the effect was greater in the evaluative condition (eliciting a 
statistically significant interaction between the factors Referent and Encoding condition). In 
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contrast, the current analysis reveals a consistent SRE across the two conditions, with no 
indication of an interaction between the factors; indeed the F-value of the interaction between 
Referent and Encoding condition was almost at zero. 
This difference between the adult and childhood pattern of performance ties in neatly 
with the account for the lack of any developmental increase in the SRE offered above. If the 
SRE in early childhood is driven by automatic responses to self-cues such as attention, as 
suggested by their lack of developmental increase, then these will be elicited to a similar 
degree in both evaluative and incidental encoding conditions. It is possible that any additional 
memory effect elicited by self-referencing in the evaluative condition may require more 
mature executive processing, with support from autobiographical memory. Thus, the 
additional self-referential advantage elicited by evaluative encoding may only emerge later in 
childhood, as previous findings using standard SRE paradigm have suggested (Halpin et al., 
1984; Ray et al., 2009). While this possibility is theoretically intriguing, it is purely 
speculative and requires investigation with a range of evaluative self-referential tasks. 
General Discussion 
 The current inquiry was designed to provide a thorough assessment of the self-
reference effect on memory in young children. In three experiments, four-, five- and six-year-
old children showed a clear memory advantage for stimuli encoded with reference to self, 
relative to stimuli encoded with reference to another person. In Experiments 1 and 2, this 
effect was found in an evaluative encoding condition (“would you [Amy] like this item”). In 
Experiment 3, the self-referential encoding advantage was also observed for a task that did 
not require self-evaluation (“where did the item appear?”). Together, these findings suggest 
that the SRE is already robust and influential in early childhood. 
As well as a reliable SRE, several interesting patterns of memory performance 
emerged from the three experiments. First, the SRE was largely consistent across the age-
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range studied (four- to six-years), and uncorrelated with working memory ability. This 
contrasts with previous SRE studies based on the trait evaluation task (Halpin et al., 1984; 
Ray et al., 2009), in which children showed an increase in SRE between middle to late 
childhood (beyond which the level is equivalent to an adult SRE). However, other researchers 
have reported a stable SRE from five years upwards (Pullyblank et al., 1985, Bennett & Sani, 
2008). The differing findings from the trait-evaluation task may reflect varying task difficulty 
across studies, raising the importance of a concrete encoding task that can be applied across 
ages. Research focusing on early childhood has reported a range of  stable SREs, SRE 
increases and decreases in SRE across development. These findings are difficult to interpret 
because the studies each examine a different aspect of self-referencing: referent identification 
(Sui & Zhu, 2005), action generation or depiction (Ross et al., 2011), and ownership 
(Cunningham et al., in press; Ross et al., 2011). Again, the experiments in the current study 
offer a much-needed systematic examination using an age-appropriate version of the standard 
SRE task. 
The stability of the effect identified in all three of the current experiments requires 
explanation. The most parsimonious is that the SRE is an age-invariant effect. While this 
account is arguably the most compelling, alternative explanations cannot be ruled out. One 
possibility is that children’s developing self-concept did not impact on their level of SRE 
because the task did not require them to make use of mature or extensive self-awareness 
(Montemayor & Eisen, 1977). The questions are relatively easy to answer with respect to 
very young children’s existing knowledge (indeed this was a deliberate feature of the design). 
It may be that using more difficult questions would elicit an upward developmental trend, 
even within early childhood, as children would have the potential to produce increasingly 
elaborate representations associated with the self-concept.  
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An intriguing alternative possibility is that developing systems may interfere with one 
another in early childhood SREs. In particular, on the basis of diminishing egocentricity it 
could be predicted that young children would show decreasing self-focus and increasing 
interest in others across the 4-6 year age range (Kesselring, Müller, 2011, Piaget, 1926/1959), 
resulting in decreasing SREs at this stage (a pattern suggested by Cunningham et al, in 
press). However, the evidence of an increase in the size of the SRE later in childhood (Halpin 
et al., 1984; Ray et al., 2009) suggests that the SRE increases with development as self-
concepts become increasingly rich and mature. The fact that no SRE change was found in the 
current experiments may therefore be because diminishing egocentricity cancels out the 
influence of self-concept development.  
A second interesting pattern in the current study is that an age-invariant SRE emerged 
in both recognition (Experiments 1-3) and source memory judgements (Experiments 2 and 3). 
The SRE is associated with episodic recollection, in which features of the encoding event are 
bound in a rich representation (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995a; Conway et al., 2001; Van den 
Bos et al., 2010). These memories can be assessed by judgements of source as well as 
recollection (see Yonelinas, 1999), so the current finding that SREs emerged in source 
memory is consistent with previous research. Less consistent is the absence of a 
developmental increase in source memory performance between four and six years. Previous 
research with children suggests that the ability to bind features of the encoding event is a 
developing skill that depends on increasing executive capacity (see Raj & Bell, 2010). This 
did not emerge in the current study however: the children were equally able to produce bound 
representations of the to-be-encoded item and the item context (indicated by accurate source 
memory judgements) across the age-range.  
A compelling explanation for the younger children’s ability to effectively judge 
source comes from automatic responses to self-cues. One reason for the encoding advantage 
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elicited by self-referencing in adults is that the self elicits physiological arousal and attracts 
attention (Bargh, 1982; Cherry, 1953; Gray et al., 2004; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006; Turk, van 
Bussel, Waiter et al., 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Brebner et al., 2011). Increases in arousal and 
attention have a predictable effect on memory: the creation of bounded episodic memories 
that are likely to be subsequently recalled (for review see Mather, 2007). While much of the 
research in this area has focused on the processing of emotional stimuli, we would suggest 
that self-referential encoding shares many of the same encoding features. It is therefore 
plausible that automatic responses to self cues, which should be relatively stable across 
development, underlie the children’s source memory performance in the current study. The 
absence of a relationship between the children’s self-referential advantage and their working 
memory supports the reasoning that automatic responses support the SRE at this early stage. 
Related to this point, the third main finding from the current inquiry is that the 
children showed a similar SRE advantage under both evaluative (Experiments 1 and 2) and 
incidental (Experiment 3) encoding conditions. The incidental encoding task is a minimal 
form of self-referencing, where conscious self-processing is not required and any increase in 
memory performance is likely to be driven by the automatic responses to self-cues described 
above (Turk et al., 2008). If children’s SRE depends on this automatic attentional response, 
then it would be expected that evaluative and incidental encoding tasks would evoke a similar 
level of self-referential memory advantage. This pattern is exactly what emerged in the 
current inquiry (Experiments 2 and 3). Turk et al.’s (2008) comparison of adult incidental and 
evaluative SREs revealed a self-referential memory advantage in both encoding conditions, 
but produced a larger effect in evaluative encoding. Conscious self-reflection in the 
evaluative condition therefore provided an additional source of elaborative or organisational 
support at encoding in the adults (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1988; Klein & Loftus, 1986, Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). In children, we did not find any evidence of an additional self-referential 
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advantage gained by conscious self-evaluation (although evaluation gave rise to better 
memory performance on the whole, due to increases in depth of processing (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972)). Firm conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of a single evaluative task, 
as it is conceivable that the current measure failed to evoke a sufficient degree (or difficulty) 
of self-evaluation. However, the data are consistent with the idea that low-level, automatic 
processes are underlying the SRE at this early stage. 
Interestingly, a distinction between the evaluative processing system and one based on 
automatic responses echoes many philosophical and psychological distinctions of self-
functioning. There have been proposals to consider the self in terms of (at least) two 
functionally distinct concepts: an ‘I’, who knows about a ‘Me’ (James, 1890). These senses 
of self have been variously incarnated as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), ‘core’ and ‘experiential’ (Northoff et al., 2006), and ‘proto-’ and ‘autobiographical’ 
(Damasio, 1999). Although individual theorists’ definitions vary, there is a consistent pattern 
of dividing the self into a low-level, physical sense, and a higher order, conscious and 
autobiographically-aware component. The finding that two functionally different aspects of 
self appear to contribute to the SRE in memory (i.e., automatic responses, or elaboration by 
the self-knowledge framework) fits neatly within these philosophical conceptualisations. 
In addition to these theoretical considerations, there are notable practical implications 
of the current work. For example, if self-referencing does impact on encoding and memory 
across childhood as the current inquiry suggests, then using the self as an encoding context 
could be an effective teaching strategy. Activating the self at encoding (e.g., generating self-
referential sentences) may helping learners to attend to incoming information and produce 
elaborate representations, increasing chances of successful retrieval. However, it is important 
to note that there may be negative ramifications of identifying methods to improve children’s 
memory. In particular, such methods can be misused in the legal system. ‘Supplementary 
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techniques’ designed to enhance recall can significantly increase the risk of errors in 
children’s testimony, with very serious consequences for both victims and suspects (for 
review see Brown, 2011). Considerable field study and interview research must be conducted 
before any memory enhancement technique is considered for use in context of children’s 
testimony.  
In addition to this caveat, a limitation of the current work is that it charts development 
across a narrow age range (four- to six-years). This range was chosen because it corresponds 
with the period at which the effects of the self on memory are particularly unclear. However, 
the subsequent developmental trajectory of incidental and evaluative SREs across childhood 
is also poorly understood and subject to conflicting data, meaning that this key influence on 
cognition is unchartered.  Applying age-appropriate paradigms across the gap in the literature 
(i.e., between early and late childhood) when both the self-concept and memory systems are 
maturing significantly would provide much-needed clarity. Systematically assessing both 
evaluative and incidental SREs during this period would also provide a chance to determine 
when the self-referential advantage elicited by evaluative encoding accrues an additional 
memory boost over that elicited by incidental encoding. The divergent pattern reported in 
early childhood here, and  in adults by Turk et al. (2008), requires replication and 
explanation. Examining the co-development of potentially related processes (e.g., self-
concept, abstract processing, increases in executive functioning and binding abilities) could 
also provide an insight into the operations that support the SRE in both adults and children. 
By offering a solid basis on which to build future research, we believe the current 
methodology provides the opportunity to further explore the mechanisms underlying the SRE 
across the lifespan. 
A further area of potential interest is the exclusivity of the effect to the self. In adult 
SRE research, changing the other-referent in SRE tasks to an intimate person (e.g., mother) 
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considerably attenuates the effect (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Ray et al., 2009; Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). Exploring the level of attenuation achieved by replacing a non-intimate other 
with ‘mother’ may shed some light on developmental changes in the conceptual overlap 
between self and others (i.e., if the separation of ‘self’ from ‘mother’ grows across childhood 
and into adolescence, using ‘mother’ as the other-referent should produce more attenuation in 
young children than in adolescents). Studying the development of these aspects of self-
referential cognition has the potential to provide valuable clarity and insight into the 
considerable influence of the self on cognition across development.  
Conclusions 
 The current inquiry establishes a robust and consistent effect of self-referential 
encoding in young children. Regardless of whether children were asked to evaluate stimuli 
with reference to self and another person, or were simply presented with self- or other-cues in 
a task-irrelevant context, we observed a memorial advantage for items processed in relation 
to self. These effects emerged in both recognition memory and source memory, and were 
consistent across four, five, and six-year-old children. These findings suggest that children’s 
self-referential encoding effects have been underestimated to date, and that the self exerts a 
powerful influence on memory from an early age.  
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Table 1 
Digit span (ability score) and uncorrected proportionate hit, source, and false alarm (FA) 
rates of four, five, and six-year-olds in the self-referent and other-referent conditions in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  
 
 Self-referent item memory 
Other-referent item 
memory 
 
Age 
group  
Digit 
Span  
Hits Source FA Hits Source FA 
Expt. 1 
4 yrs - .76 - .23 .67 - .23 
5 yrs - .91 - .06 .85 - .06 
6 yrs - .92 - .04 .88 - .04 
Expt. 2 
4 yrs 110.1 .83 .73 .09 .80 .67 .11 
5 yrs 116.0 .91 .79 .05 .86 .69 .09 
6 yrs 117.4 .88 .85 .01 .85 .78 .01 
Expt. 3 
4 yrs 111.7 .75 .56 .11 .67 .43 .07 
5 yrs 120.2 .76 .63 .02 .69 .49 .02 
6 yrs 122.7 .75 .61 .01 .68 .48 .01 
 
Note. FA rate in Experiment 1 is duplicated across self- and other referent items. 
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Figure 1. Example trial in the encoding task (Top Panel: Experiments 1 & 2; Bottom Panel: 
Experiment 3).  
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Figure 2. Corrected proportionate recognition scores of 4, 5, and 6 year old children in 
Experiment 1. (Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.)  
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Figure 3. Corrected proportionate source memory scores of 4, 5, and 6 year old children in 
Experiment 2. (Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.)  
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Figure 4. Corrected proportionate source memory scores of 4, 5, and 6 year old children in 
Experiment 3. (Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.)  
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Figure 5. Corrected proportionate recognition scores for self-referent and other-referent items 
in Experiments 2 and 3, collapsed across age group. (Error bars represent one standard error 
of the mean.) 
 
